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1. Welfare foundations of institutions.
Because the philosophy of this paper differs somewhat from that of the
theoretical literature on regulation, we take the liberty of discussing its
approach in a lengthy introduction. The ideas developed in this section are
not new. Indeed, they are central in political science.1 Our goal is to
recast them in a form and vocabulary familiar in economic analysis.
An idealized, but illuminating view of regulatory institutions is that
they result from a constitution drafted by some benevolent "founding fathers"
or "social planners" behind the veil of ignorance. The founding fathers have
some assessment of social welfare, for example, the sum of utilities in
society. [In our model, the motivation to regulate is wholly benevolent, as
opposed to serving the interests of the industry. Even in such a setup,
regulation can encounter problems.] The founding fathers must delegate actual
social choices to other agents, broadly labelled "public decision makers," and
they design a set of institutions or rules of the game that as much is
feasible induce these public decision-makers to behave as if their two
assessments of welfare coincided.
This view of institutions can be enriched in several directions. First,
one may note that the veil of ignorance is often an abstraction. The founding
fathers (or their descendants) may have vested interests in the design of the
constitution. Their assessment of social welfare then differs from that of
impartial social planners. Second, institutions may not be associated with a
constitution. They may also result from a law or even from durable tradition
and social norms. Allowing for these two alterations of the previous view
preserves its main points of separation between planning and control or
between intentions and actual decision making, and of the concomitant need to
1They are also implicit in some models of public finance. For instance,
Brennan and Buchanan [1977] argue that institutions are "uncontrollable" once
they are established and study a model in which the government maximizes
revenue subject to tax constraints imposed by the Constitution.
constrain the executants.2 While we will henceforth assume that founding
fathers draft a constitution, the notion of "constitution" should be
interpreted broadly, the "founding fathers" might stand for law makers
(Congress, state legislatures; see Section 4) or tradition, and the so-called
social welfare function could be generalized to account for potentially
partial goals of the founding fathers.
The design of a constitution is trivial when the founding fathers can
design a mechanism that assembles a group of public decision makers whose
preferences coincide with their own. The optimal constitution then consists
in delegating all authority to these benevolent public decision makers.
[Benevolence, of course, does not imply that regulatory outcomes will conform
to the founding fathers' and the public decision makers' best-of-all-worlds.
The public decision makers may have poor information about the economy. To
elicit information, they must design costly incentive schemes for the economic
agents and set up regulatory agencies to reduce the informational asymmetries
with these economic agents.] The benevolent-public-decision-makers paradigm
is the natural first step in analyzing the politics of regulation. It focuses
on the public decision makers (e.g., Congress)'s control over agencies and
economic agents and it derives the organizational response to the agencies'
natural tendency to identify with interest groups.3
A serious drawback of the benevolent-public-decision-makers paradigm is
that it cannot explain limitations on the scope of authority conferred on
public decision makers by the constitution: Any restriction imposed by the
A good case in point is the observation that deck-stacking (through
administrative procedures and assignment of the burden of proof, for instance)
enables a legislature to ensure that agencies "operate to mirror the political
forces that gave rise to the agency's legislative mandate long after the
coalition behind the legislation has disbanded" (McCubbins-Noll-Weingast
[1987, p. 262]).
3See Laffont-Tirole [1988a]. See also Baron [1985] and Spiller [1988] for
models of regulation with multiple principals.
founding fathers on the benevolent public decision makers amounts to a
self-mutilation and can only be welfare reducing. In practice, the scope of
authority of public decision makers is limited. First, they have a mandate to
regulate some firms, industries or activities, but not others. Second, they
are constrained to conduct regulatory hearings and to disseminate the
information they obtain. Third, they are given a limited set of instruments
to regulate. In the U.S., agencies regulating the electric utilities or the
telecommunications industry are prohibited from operating monetary transfers
to the regulated firms. Similarly, the Environmental Protection Agency is
constrained to use bans or technology standards on some chemical products, and
is allowed to use warning labels, instructions or tax incentives for others.
Fourth, there are restrictions on how much the current administration may
commit future administrations. 5
The benevolent-public-decision-maker paradigm also has little to say
about Montesquieu's well-established vision of separation of powers among
branches of government (e.g., executive, legislative, and judiciary) because
it implies that there is no need to keep a delicate set of controls between
branches of government; nor can it fully account for the watchdog role of
non-governmental groups (consumers, mass media) in public decision making.
The paradigm thus misses some economic aspects of government decision making
and probably most of the interesting issues in political science.
The first key to understanding the development of institutions is to
4An exception to this is when a benevolent regulator lacks commitment power in
a multi-period setting. For instance, a constitutional upper bound on the
rate of growth of money supply may prevent a welfare reducing inflationary
spiral that may arise even under welfare-maximizing monetary authorities.
Similarly, regulatory lags may alleviate the welfare-reducing ratchet effect
that may arise even under a benevolent regulator.
See McCubbins [1985] for a discussion of constraints on bureaucratic
decision-making. Lewis and Sappington [1988] analyze the choice among a few
commitment possibilities when regulators change over time and internalize
consumer welfare during their tenure as regulators only.
envision a conflict between the founding fathers and the public decision
makers. The public decision makers cannot be trusted to perfectly implement
the founding fathers' intent either because they are self interested, have an
intrinsically different view of social welfare, or, as will be assumed in this
paper, because they have an incentive to identify with specific interest
groups.6 The founding fathers must "stack the deck" in favor of their own
objectives by constraining the public decision makers.
The second key is to take the notion of "veil of ignorance" literally.
We must assume that the founding fathers are unable to design a "complete
constitution" in which all future contingencies are perfectly foreseen and
costlessly described. For, if they could write such a complete constitution,
public decision making would amount to the implementation of a precise mandate
-- formally, the implementation of a revelation mechanism in which all
economic agents announce their information when they receive it. The founding
fathers would only set up a court that would ensure that their desiderata are
implemented.8 The only branch of government would be the judicial branch. In
contrast, public decision makers have a non-trivial role when given a vague
mandate, i.e., a mandate that incompletely describes the set of states of
nature. Government is then divided into the judiciary branch whose role is to
ensure that the instructions that have been included in the constitution be
fulfilled; and a more activist branch (which itself can be divided into
several sub branches, e.g., legislative and executive) that has the authority
Empirically it may be difficult to distinguish between the public decision
makers' intrinsic preferences and the ones that are induced by their belonging
to a social class or by the collusion with interest groups.
7The complete constitution is the analog of a complete or comprehensive
contract in contract theory (except that it is not written by the parties who
will implement it).
8The court would then be the analog of Myerson [1986]'s "mediator." See
Laffont-Maskin [1982] and Myerson [1986] for general, abstract models of
complete contracting.
to fill in the details when contingencies that have not been included in the
constitution occur. Note here the resemblance with Williamson [1975, 1985]'s
and Grossman and Hart [1986]'s seminal work on vertical integration. Grossman
and Hart define authority as the residual rights of control conferred by
ownership; that is, one of the parties to a transaction is given power to
impose decisions in states of nature not specified in their original contract.
In the same spirit, we offer to view the constitution as an incomplete
(social) contract.
Williamson and Grossman-Hart emphasize the effects on economic decisions
of the distribution of authority between a buyer and a seller.9  Similarly, in
the political arena, authority over economic transactions to be regulated is
distributed among the various branches of government through rules of
procedures, precedence between executive and legislative, etc. And, as in a
contract between economic agents, the range of decisions and instruments for
the party on which authority is bestowed can be constrained ex-ante.
What prevents the public decision makers from abusing their authority to
achieve their own goals or the goals of the interest groups with which they
identify?10 One safeguard is the division of authority among branches of
government. A constitution ought to create a viable system of checks and
balances (which if possible do not jeopardize flexibility in public decision
making). For instance, an agency may be independent in its decision making,
but Congress may in the long run exert indirect control through the
appropriations procedure. Similarly, the Senate and the House may exert
9See Hart-Moore [1988] for a more general theory of distribution of authority
among n parties.
10 In the U.S., the concern about the usurpation of government by powerful
interest groups dates back to Madison [1788]. The 1946 Administrative
Procedures Act was to a large extent a response to this concern about capture.
And more recently, the courts have referred to industry influence to vindicate
judicial review of agency decisions (e.g., in State Farm, 463US29, 1983). For
a more complete discussion of this, see Sunstein [1986].
reciprocal control. But ultimately, what exerts control over the public
decision makers is the existence of courts and of a constitution. Note: we
are here taking a passive view of the role of courts. That is, they act on
hard information transmitted by various parties (e.g., whistle-blowers:
consumers, mass media, discontented or idealistic civil servants, etc.), and
content themselves with correcting deviations from what is specified in the
constitution.11,12
The agenda set above -- to develop an incomplete-contract approach to
public decision making -- has wide scope, and it would be presumptuous to
claim that we have got a good handle even on a small subset of issues. The
purpose of this paper is to illustrate some of the above ideas in a particular
context. In the process of building an example, we will discuss some
modelling issues that are likely to be relevant in other models of institution
design. The reader should be warned that we do not possess a fully
satisfactory formalization of incomplete contracting. The formidable task of
developing the corresponding theoretical apparatus is beyond the limited scope
of the paper. We content ourselves with comparing two standard institutions,
and (notwithstanding some loose comments in Section 4) we do not enquire into
the optimality of these two institutions in the larger class of institutions
C1 ourts may exert a more activist role and act on the basis of soft
information. They then have discretionary power and compete with the
executive and legislative branches in filling in unforeseen contingencies
(Shapiro [1986]). Hamilton [1788], in the spirit of Montesquieu, argued that
"the judiciary is beyond comparison the weakest of the three departments of
power," that its duty is "to declare all acts contrary to the manifest tenor
of the constitution void" and that discretion in the courts should be limited.
In a similar spirit, the 1984 Chevron decision of the U.S. Supreme Court
sharply restricted the scope of judicial review of agency decisions. The
Supreme Court stated that the agency was due considerable deference if
Congress had not directly addressed the precise question at issue.
Our adhesion to a passive view of courts is not a value judgment, but
rather a convenient as well as realistic expositional device.
1 2Under some legislations, only affected parties (firms, consumers) have the
"standing" to address the courts directly. Whistle blowers and civil servants
then transmit the information indirectly to courts.
that are feasible given the information and the transaction costs of writing
the constitution at the date it is enacted.
Section 2 develops a model of a natural monopoly in which the
constitution and a countervailing power (consumers) put limits on the
discretion of non-benevolent public decision makers. Section 3 solves the
model and obtains the comparative statics results. Section 4 discusses the
limitations of our analysis, and Section 5 concludes.
2. The model.
2.1. Description of the model. The starting point for this research was the
intriguing fact that in some countries and industries, regulators are legally
prevented from transferring money to regulated firms, which must then cover
their costs entirely through charges to customers. One may adopt the view
that this institution survives only because of a general lack of understanding
of the basic economic principle that the regulated firm's fixed cost should
not affect the consumers' decision of how much to buy. This may be, but
before hastily jumping to the conclusion that the institution is irrational,
we may wonder whether there do not exist basic underlying economic forces. As
discussed in Section 1, a mistrust of regulators should be the foundation for
a rational theory of restrictions in the scope of their authority, of the
prohibition of transfers in this particular context. We argue that this
institution may result from the need to involve parties outside the government
(consumers, mass media) to perform the role of watchdogs and to prevent abuse
of the government's discretionary power.
In a nutshell we assume that there is a single public decision maker --
the "agency" -- and a single-product regulated firm which is a natural
monopoly. The "constitution" (or Congress or state legislature) gives the
agency the vague mandate of maximizing social welfare, i.e., of extracting the
firm's rent and of pricing its product efficiently. We compare two
institutions. In the first, labelled "marginal cost pricing" or "transfer,"
the agency can use the full set of instruments: monetary transfer to the firm
and price control. Maximizing social welfare then consists of charging
marginal cost, or rather, as we shall see, the appropriate version of marginal
cost in the presence of a shadow cost of public funds; and in choosing
transfers so as to extract the firm's rent. In the second institution,
labelled "average cost pricing" or "no transfer," the agency is limited to
price controls and is not allowed to transfer money to the firm. Maximizing
social welfare subject to this constraint yields average cost pricing. The
firm's price is as low as is consistent with the firm's budget balance, where
the firm's cost includes its managers' compensation.
Whatever its mandate, the agency, which for simplicity knows the firm's
technology, may identify with producer interests. What may prevent such
collusion is the possibility that consumers (or the mass media which is
indirectly rewarded by consumers through an increase in circulation or
ratings) may find it in their interest to investigate the agency's activities.
If they find hard evidence of wrongdoing (can prove that the agency defended
the firm's interests by allowing a high price), they can ask the judicial
system to overrule the agency's decision and to punish the agency.
Obviously "marginal cost pricing," which gives full freedom to the
agency, dominates average cost pricing when the agency is benevolent.
However, the two institutions respond differently to the perversion of public
decision making. Their comparison hinges on the stake in collusion they
create for the firm and the agency and on the incentives they give to the
public to be effective watchdogs.
1 3 )14
It is interesting to note that the theoretical literature on regulation
reflects the two institutional arrangements. Most of the literature on
asymmetric information and incentives in regulation assumes that the regulator
can operate transfers to the regulated sector. In contrast, the literature on
cost-of-service (Boiteux) pricing, multiproduct firms and contestability
assumes away transfers. We feel uneasy about exogenously ruling out
1 3The public in our model plays the role of an "external monitor" (although it
is not under contract to check on the "internal monitor" -- the agency).
Kofman and Lawarree [1988] develop an interesting model of internal and
external auditing of management. They show in particular that maximum
punishments may not be optimal as they may induce more collusion.
1 4See Freixas-Laffont [1985] for different considerations on the choice between
average and marginal cost pricing.
transfers. While this assumption is realistic in some industries on legal
grounds, it may mislead the researcher when formalizing the regulator's
objectives. As mentioned above, a rational theory of regulation implies that
the prohibition is motivated by a mistrust of the regulator. There is thus a
tension between the two assumptions that the regulators maximize social
welfare and that they are not given free rein.
We now spell out the model in more detail. It considers a four-party
hierarchy: founding fathers/agency/firm/consumers.
a) Firm: The firm produces output q at cost
(2.1) C - (f-e)+cq.
The cost or technology parameter B can take one of two values: "low" or
"efficient" (f) with probability v and "high" or "inefficient" ( ) with
probability (1-v). The firm and the agency know the realization of f. Let Af
SýB-B > 0. The firm's managers incur an increasing and convex (monetary)
disutility '(e) (0' > 0, 0" > 0) by exerting effort e to reduce cost.
Note that we put all technological uncertainty on the fixed cost. This
is an important assumption which will be discussed later.
The gross consumer surplus is denoted by S(q), an increasing and concave
function. Let P(q) m S'(q) be the inverse demand function and q - D(p) be the
demand function. The revenue is thus R(q) - P(q)q. Letting t denote the
(net) income of the firm, the firm's utility or rent is
(2.2) U - t-4(e).
We normalize the firm's reservation utility at 0, so that the firm's
participation or individual rationality constraint is:
(2.3) U 2 0.
We will actually assume that the firm faces limited punishment, so that U must
always be non-negative.15
Our accounting convention is that the firm receives the revenue R from
the consumers', pays cost C and retains net income t. In the "marginal cost
pricing" institution, this means that the State must transfer (C+t-R) to the
firm. In the "average cost pricing" institution, necessarily C+t - R.
b) The agency: The agency receives income s from the State and has utility
function:
(2.4) V(s) - s.
We will assume that the income s is received if and only if it is not
proved that the agency has violated the constitution. If the consumers find
hard evidence that the agency cheated, the agency receives no income. That
is, limited liability limits the punishment of the agency to a zero income.
We assume for notational simplicity that the agency's reservation income (and
utility) is equal to 0.16 Last, we assume for simplicity that the income s
received in the absence of evidence of wrongdoing is fixed by the
1 5We thus assume either that consumers can (or have incentives to) search only
during the hearing period (so that the firm cannot end up with utility -O(e)
after choosing e and later be denied any payment); or that the firm has
utility function V(U) - U for U : 0 and V(U) - -= for U < 0 and there is an
arbitrarily small probability that the evidence found by consumers (see below)
is inaccurate.
16We could with little change allow positive reservation utilities (indeed, we
do so in some simulations in the section on alternative cost technologies).
The agency is then really punished for malfeasance (in the sense that it gets
less than its reservation utility). What matters for the theory is that
punishment is limited. An example of limited punishment is the dismissal of a
utility manager with firm- and industry-specific skills.
One could consider slight variants in which the agency is rewarded
differently when there is no wrongdoing depending on whether consumers find
evidence. The qualitative results would be unchanged. Note also that it can
be argued that in the presence of intervention costs, consumers will intervene
only if there is wrongdoing, so that our assumption is not too unrealistic.
constitution.
The agency learns 6. This signal is soft information so that it can
misreport P if it chooses to. 1 7
c) The founding fathers: The founding fathers' utility is the sum of the
utilities of all parties in the economy, where the consumers' utility is equal
to their net surplus [S(q)-P(q)q] and the taxpayers' utility is equal to minus
the expenditure on the regulated industry (s+t+C-P(q)q) times the shadow cost
A of raising public funds through distortionary taxation.18
(2.5) W - U+V+[S(q)-P(q)q-(l+A)(s+t+C-P(q)q)].
Using (2.2) and (2.4) to eliminate t and s in (2.5) yields:
(2.6) W - [S(q)+AP(q)q]-(l+A)(P-e+cq+i(e))-AU-AV.
That is, from the "generalized consumer surplus" (S(q)+AP(q)q) must be
subtracted (1+A) times the total cost of the project (f-e+cq+O(e)) and A times
the rents left to the firm and the agency. The important property of (2.6)
for our analysis is that the founding fathers dislike leaving a rent to the
firm and the agency.
It is too costly for the founding fathers to describe the technology when
1 7Because we model the agency's information as soft, the burden of the proof is
placed on the monitors. Alternatively, we could have assumed that the agency
may or may not receive hard information about f (as in Laffont-Tirole
[1988a]). Thus when the agency reports P or f, it brings verifiable
information that these are the true values. When it reports it obtained no
hard information, the monitor may attempt to prove that B takes a particular
value (P in this case). The analysis would be similar to that developed here.
18 (s+t+C-P(q)q) is the amount of money required to pay the agency and to
compensate the firm. To obtain these funds the State levies taxes which at
the margin cost society $(1+A) per $1 raised. The shadow cost of public
funds, A, is determined economy-wide and is independent of the regulation of
this industry.
they draft the constitution. Instead, they give the mandate to maximize the
sum of utilities over a specified set of instruments. This mandate is
implemented by the agency, and is enforced by the courts. The courts, if
called upon by some party, can find out the parameters of the economic
environment by itself, except for P the value of which can only be learned
from consumers. The courts enforce the welfare-maximizing policy conditional
A
either on the announcement 6 of P by the agency, or on the true value of 8 if
A
it differs from P and is discovered by the consumers.
d) The consumers: The consumers, who enjoy net surplus S(q)-P(q)q and who
also have prior v on P being ý can spend 0 (no search) or E (search) to
investigate. Part of E can be thought of as a cost of organization (in this
respect, industrial consumers and households may differ); another part is the
cost of going to court if they have a case (see below). They find the true 4
if they search and do not learn anything if they do not search. Their
evidence on 4 is supposed to be hard, so that they can substantiate their
claim about P in front of judges. We assume that taxpayers are too dispersed
and do not intervene in the regulatory process. Our model thus reflects the
fact that in practice interveners often represent a subset of interested
parties and stress increasing their fraction of the (variable-dimensioned)
pie.
2.2. The benevolent agency benchmark. Let us begin with the benchmark in
which the agency cannot collude with the firm. The consumers have no
incentives to search in this case, because the agency tells the truth.
U Marginal cost pricing: suppose that the agency can use all
instruments (t,p). The optimal policy has V - 0 and U - 0, as the firm's rent
is extracted whatever the technology. W is maximized under full information.
Cost minimization requires that the marginal disutility of effort be equal to
the marginal cost savings:
(2.7) 0'(e) - 1 or e = e for all f.
And the price is given by a simple Ramsey formula:
(2.8) pC . ( 1) or p - pMC for all f,
where q(p) is the price elasticity of demand (r(p) - - / ). The Lerner
index (price-marginal cost margin) is inversely proportional to the elasticity
of demand (because public funds are costly, revenue is socially valuable, so
pricing is intermediate between marginal cost and monopoly pricing). Note
that the price is entirely determined by the marginal cost (indeed, for A - 0,
MCp - c), and that it is independent of B. The net transfer to the firm is
tMC - O(e*). Let
(2.9) WMC(B) - [S(D(pMC ))+pMCD(pMC)]-(l+A)(P-e +cD(pMC)+O(e ))
be the optimal welfare and
(2.10) WMC - wMC () and QMC - wMC(4) - wMC.(I+A)(ý.).
M Average cost pricing. Although the institution is dominated by the
previous one (which is socially optimal) when the agency is benevolent, let us
assume that the agency is not allowed to transfer money to the firm. The
firm's price is then given by the smallest price that yields budget balance:1 9
(2.11) pD(p) - O-e +cD(p)+O(e *) or p - pAC(0).
The firm's revenue pD(p) must cover the firm's cost [f-e+cD(p)] as well as the
managers' compensation O(e) which, like the cost, cannot be paid from public
1 9We will for simplicity assume that (2.11) has a solution, and that there
exists a unique solution that is lower than the monopoly price. A sufficient 2
condition for the latter assumption is that (p-c)D(p) be quasi-concave or 2D'
> DD".
funds. The benevolent agency, knowing 8, can control e (by disallowing
excessive cost). The desired level of effort minimizes [O(e)-e] and is
therefore the same as under marginal cost pricing. Note that the firm's price
is now an increasing function of 8.
Because the State operates no transfer, and the agency and the firm have
no rent, social welfare is
(2.12) WAC() - Sn (qAC ()),
where Sn(q) = S(q)-P(q)q denotes the net surplus and
qAC () = D(pAC(p)) •
We let:
(2.13) WA C  WAC () and WAC e WACO ) .
2.3. Collusive agency. From now on, we allow the agency to collude with the
firm. We assume that transferring an income equivalent s to the agency costs
(1+Af)s to the firm, where Af > 0 measures the deadweight loss (or transaction
cost) associated with the transfer.20 The agency's income equivalent is then
s+s. For simplicity, we assume that the agency makes a take-it-or-leave-it
offer, according to which the firm must transfer a certain amount of income
equivalent (conditional on the decision not being reversed by the courts) to
A
the agency if the latter reports some P. More generally, we could allow
bargaining and rent sharing between the firm and the agency.
The timing is as follows:
1. The founding fathers choose between the two institutions: i - MC or AC
2 0This transfer can take many forms (bribe, entertainment expenses, prospect of
job, social relationships, campaign contributions to members of the
Congressional committee overseeing the agency, etc.); see Laffont-Tirole
[1988] for a discussion.
and determine the income of the agency s.
2. Society (firm, agency, consumers; courts if they are addressed -- see #5)
learns the relevant technology (and that P is either ý or 8 and the
demand function). The only remaining piece of private (and soft)
information is P, which is learned by the firm and the agency.
3. The agency can offer a side-contract to the firm, which specifies a
A
side-transfer (conditional on 6 o f not being found out) if the agency
A
announces f 0# P. Side transfers are not observable by third parties.
4. The agency announces its intended policy, which is equivalent to
A 
Mannouncing B. It de facto proposes the socially optimal allocation (pMC
MC AC ^  ^t ) or (p AC()) for parameter f under whatever institution MC or AC is
relevant (this allocation was determined in subsection 2.2).
A
5. Learning f, the consumers decide whether to search or not.
6. If consumers do not find any hard information, or if they find that 8 -
A
8, the agency's proposed allocation is implemented. If the consumers
find out that 0 z 8, they can ask for a correction of the proposed
policy; in this case the allocation implemented is the socially optimal
one for parameter 8 and the relevant institution.
7. Production (and possibly transfers) take place.
Stage 1 is that of constitutional design. Stage 4 corresponds to a
regulatory hearing. It is consistent with the constraints of due process
imposed in the Administrative Procedures Act in the U.S., according to which
an agency cannot announce a policy without warning, but must give notice and
solicit comments. As argued by McCubbins et al. [1987] and formalized here,
this procedure provides non-agency participants with a chance to submit
viewpoints for the purpose of altering the proposed rule. Stage 6 assumes
weak evidentiary standards in administrative law (here, the constitution) that
give the agency flexibility (its proposed policy is implemented unless
consumers come up with hard evidence).
By abuse of notation, we let s denote the agency's (observable) income
when there is no evidence of wrongdoing (that is, the agency gets s plus the
side transfer, if any). The agency receives 0 if the consumers find out that
A
~ fi and report it to the court.
Clearly the agency and the firm have no incentive to collude when ~ - B.
A A
The agency then announces the truth: B - 8. When B - 8, announcing B -
allows the firm to reduce its effort. More precisely, it can choose effort e
such that ý-e - 4-e or e - e -AB. Cost accounting then does not reveal that
the agency cheated, and the firm which receives compensation O(e*) under
either regime enjoys rent
(2.13) U - Af #(e ) O #(e )-O(e -AP).
Af will be called the firm's stake in collusion. Note that it is independent
of the institution (this does not generalize to more general technologies --
see below). The agency can thus ask s - Af/(l+Af) from the firm in exchange
for the policy corresponding to P -= being implemented.
Let Ac denote the consumers' stake, i.e., the increase in their net
A
surplus when they can rectify the policy corresponding to 8 - B into that for
f - f (we assume that consumers are only a small fraction of taxpayers so that
they neglect the reduction s in the agency's income. This assumption can be
trivially relaxed). Under institution i:
(2.14) A - S (qi()) -Sn (q1 ()).
We assume that
ACAssumption A: E S vA
c
Assumption A guarantees that if the agency always cheats (reports b when the
truth is f), the consumers have an incentive to search under average cost
pricing. [They have no incentive to search under marginal cost pricing, as
the price is insensitive to the level of p.]
Last, let x denote the probability that the agency cheats; y the
A
probability that the consumers search (when P - 8; they have no incentive to
A
search when P - P).
The expected social welfare under institution i E (MC,AC) is given by:
(2.15) Wi - (l-v)[ i-As-y iE]
+ v(l-x )[Wi-As]
+ vx [(l-yi) i + f - As +yiW i yiE .
The first term in the right-hand side of (2.15) is social welfare when 6
- B minus the social cost As of the agency's income (the agency does not
misreport in this state of nature) minus the expected search cost for
consumers (which obviously is incurred in vain). Suppose next that 0 - P.
With probability (l-xi), the agency does not cheat and the consumers do not
search as they react to the proposed policy. The only cost relative to the
benevolent agency case is that associated with the agency's income, which
explains the second term. With probability xi, the agency announces -
iThe consumers search with probability yi. If they search, they discover the
deception, and welfare (gross of search costs) is the welfare under a
benevolent agency. If they do not search, everything is as if the agency were
benevolent and the true value of 8 were 8, except that the agency receives
income s and furthermore enjoys rent Af/(l+Af) appropriated from the firm (it
i f i
can be checked that Q1 + 1+A < W for i E (MC,AC)).f
3. The solution.
We first determine the equilibrium probabilities of cheating (xi) and
(yi
searching (y ) in the "inspection game" that arises when P - P. Substituting
into (2.15) and maximizing over s then yields the expected social welfare
under the two institutions. Last, we determine how the founding fathers'
choice between the two institutions is affected by a few parameters.
ACU AC pricing: Since E < A v, the consumers would search if the agency
cheated with probability one when B - B, and therefore the agency would not
cheat; on the other hand if the.consumers do not search the agency cheats.
Hence the equilibrium must be a mixed-strategy equilibrium where the
probability of cheating of the agency, x, is determined by:
AC(3.1) E - A vx,
c
Because the agency receives its income s if and only if the consumers do not
bring evidence of wrongdoing, the probability of the consumers' searching, y,
is determined by
f
(3.2) (l-y) l+1A ys,
in order for the agency to be indifferent between cheating and not cheating.
(3.2) can be written:
Af
(3.3) y - A+f
f +s(1+ )
Equation (3.3) highlights a trade-off between the two checks on collusion.
One check is consumer search. The other consists of giving an "efficiency
income," i.e., an income greater than the reservation income, to the agency in
order to reduce the temptation to collude. (3.3) shows that any increase in
agency income reduces search by consumers.
We maximize social welfare:
(3.4) WAC - [l-v+vx(l-y)]QAC+v(l-x+xy)WAC
*(e*
- [(l-v)y+vxy]E-[l-vxy]As+vx(l-y) +
f
subject to (3.1), (3.3) and s Ž 0. Substituting (3.1) and (3.3) into (3.4) to
eliminate x and y, the reader will check that the resulting objective function
WAC(s) is strictly quasi-concave in s. The optimal agency income s is
determined, when it is an interior solution, by:
(1+Af) y A(3.5) A(l-vxy) * (l-v+vx)E-vxAs -vx A+f(e)
[(1+Af)s +Af] 1
where
AC E
AC
c
and
Af
y -
Af +s (1+Af)
If at s - 0, the left-hand side of (3.5) exceeds its right-hand side, we
have a corner solution s - 0. The agency cheats, and y is equal to 1.
U MC pricing: Under MC pricing, the price is independent of 8 because
the marginal cost is certain (see (2.8)) and therefore the consumers have no
stake in the regulatory decision and do not search (y - 0). Consequently, the
agency always cheats (x - 1), its income is optimally set equal to zero, and
social welfare can be written:
(3.6) WMC .MC + (e*)1+Af
First, we show that either institution can be optimal depending on the
values of the parameters:
Proposition 1: MC pricing dominates AC pricing for small uncertainty.
Proof: When AP - 0, WM C ÷ WF B (first-best social welfare, which would be
obtained under a benevolent agency and marginal cost pricing) since QMC 4 WMC
and t(e ) -4 0.
On the other hand, WA C is bounded away from WF B , because pricing, which
includes the fixed cost, is inadequate. Q.E.D.
More interestingly, AC pricing may dominate MC pricing. For example, we
have:
Proposition 2: AC pricing may dominate MC pricing when the search costs E are
low enough and the cost of collusion Xf high enough.
Proof: When E tends to 0, the probability of cheating x under AC pricing
tends to 0 from (3.1). Equation (3.5) actually indicates a corner solution:
s - 0 for E sufficiently small. This and equation (3.2) imply that the
consumers always search: y - 1. Thus, as E - 0,
wAC wMC (wAC wMC)+ [WA C AC  (e )
Now, we can adjust the parameters such that ýAC , MWC. Indeed, we know that
MC D(p MC)
D'(pMC )
and that
* *
-AC *+(e )-ep 
- c + -AC
D(p )
-AC MC
We can choose the parameters so that p - p Then, as E tends to 0,
wACwMC ACC (e
Now, let A increase until(e ) becomes less than WAC-wAC (which isf l+Af
independent of Af).
Q.E.D.
Intuitively, when E becomes small, the probability of cheating becomes
small. If the AC price for 8 - ý is identical to the MC price (which is
possible because of the shadow cost of public funds), the comparison of
welfares reduces to that when B = P. The welfare loss when f = 8 is due to
collusion-under MC pricing and to the inclusion of the fixed cost in the price
under AC pricing. The first loss is
LMC . WMC.-MC - (e )l+Af
(efficiency loss minus rent to agency) and the second is
LA C _ WMC_W A C
(efficiency loss). So when VMC equals QAC
MC AC WAC -AC 4(e )
L -L - l+ > 0
f
for a high Af.
It is convenient to write the difference in welfare between the two
institutions as:
(3.7) AW WAC-w MC = wAC WMC+v[AC-wAC] (l-x+xy)
- [(l-v)y+vxy]E-[l-vxy]As
c(e )
- v(l-x(l-y)) 1+Af
where x, y, and s are the values under AC pricing (see (3.1), (3.3), and
(3.5)).
Proposition 3: 1) a(AW) > 0 ii) a( < 0.aA faE
Proof: See Appendix 1.
When the monitoring cost E decreases, the probability of cheating under
AC pricing decreases (from (3.1)). The lower monitoring cost and probability
of cheating both raise welfare and the desirability of AC pricing. Thus,
Proposition 3 suggests that the prohibition of transfers is more likely to be
observed in countries or industries where consumer groups are well-organized
to investigate whether regulated prices are justified.
An increase in the cost of collusion Af has two effects. First, it
reduces the income (Af/(l+Af)) received by the agency when it cheats and is
not discovered. Because there is more cheating and less monitoring by
consumers (and therefore more income received by the agency) under MC pricing,
an increase in Af favors AC pricing. Second, an increase in Af reduces the
attractiveness of cheating for the agency and therefore lowers the probability
y that consumers search under AC pricing. But a decrease in y keeping s
constant is socially beneficial (a(AW)/ay < 0), because, at the optimal s,
monitoring is encouraged beyond the efficient point in order to reduce s.
Thus both effects have the same sign.
The conclusion on the role of Af on the choice between institutions
relies both on our choice of technology and on the consumers' being the only
"outside monitor" (the agency is the "inside monitor"). First, as we will
note below, an increase in Af may favor the MC pricing institution when the
uncertainty affects marginal cost as well. Second, the assumption that the
consumers are the only outside monitor implies that there is absolutely no
check on collusion under the MC pricing institution when the uncertainty
affects the fixed cost only. The agency always colludes with the industry and
is never caught. In such a situation one would predict a high demand for the
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creation of an alternative outside monitor such as a public auditor. Once
2 11n particular state-owned enterprises are often subject to financial audits.
public auditors are introduced, the analysis under MC pricing becomes
qualitatively similar to that under AC pricing: The equilibrium of the
inspection game between the public auditors and the agency is in mixed
strategy as long as the public auditors have enough incentive to monitor
AC(equations (3.1) and (3.2) hold with Ac and E replaced by the public
auditors' incentive and cost of auditing). An increase in Af then reduces the
equilibrium probability and thus the cost of inspection by public auditors
under MC pricing and may favor the MC pricing institution. For these two
reasons, we do not find it implausible to imagine that transfers are less
likely to be prohibited when public decision makers are less prone to collude
with the regulated industry.2 2
Proposition 3 characterizes the effect of the collusion and monitoring
variables on the choice between the two institutions. The effect of the
traditional variables (cost and demand variables, and shadow price of public
funds) is more complex to study and is likely to be ambiguous.
We now study the optimal agency income under AC pricing.
Such audits not only check that the firm's accounting is properly performed,
but also report unprofitable activities and waste. Such audits, while useful,
are very imperfect instruments of control. In the U.S., the corporation
audits created by the Government Corporation Control Act of 1945 are performed
only once every three years since 1974. Similarly, the French national audit
body (Cour des Comptes), while having substantial audit powers, is seriously
short of manpower. Another issue is that public controllers may become the
advocates of the state-owned enterprise in the ministry (see, for example, the
1967 Nora report in France). We will say more about alternative outside
monitors in Section 4.
2 2That is, when Af is high. A high Af may stem from the civil servants' being
"public minded" (their having a high psychological cost of receiving
transfers), from a frequent rotation among regulatory jobs (which makes trust
between agency personnel and regulated firms harder to develop), or other
factors. These considerations (together with the difference in the
organization of consumer groups -- represented by the parameter E in our
model) might for instance be reflected in the different treatments of
transfers in the regulation of electric utilities and telephone companies in
France (transfers allowed) and the U.S. (transfers prohibited).
Proposition 4: Under AC pricing:
(a) The agency's income is non-increasing in the shadow cost
of public funds.
AAC f
(b) If vAAAC E + , the agency's income is equal to zero
AC Affor all A. If vAc < E + - -, the agency's income strictly
decreases with A on [0,AO] and is equal to 0 for A E [AO,+),
for some 10 > 0.
When A grows, it becomes more and more costly to reward the agency, and the
efficiency-income method of avoiding collusion (s > 0) becomes less attractive
relative to the method of letting the consumers monitor (part a) of
Proposition 4). When E is small, consumer search is cheap and allows a better
allocative efficiency. Increasing s beyond 0 would be detrimental because it
would reduce consumer search. In contrast when E is larger (but still
AC
satisfies assumption A: vAc > E), it is optimal to give an efficiency income
to the agency to reduce the extent of search. The condition vAAC _ E +
c 1+Af
is straightforward to interpret: When s - 0, the consumers always search and
have private gain from searching Ac and exert negative externality Af/(l+Af)
on the agency, with conditional probability vx/(l-v+vx) that the agency has
cheated given announcement 8. They have private cost E. Using (3.1), the
condition says that the consumers have socially too much incentive to search.
A positive efficiency income for the agency reduces search by consumers and is
socially beneficial.
Proof: a) We earlier noted that WAC(s,A) is strictly quasi-concave in s. It
thus suffices to show that jA 0. We have
S8s
a2wAC
8Acs -(l-vxy) + vxs < 0,8 as as
as i.AC and WAC do not depend on A and a < 0.
as
b) awAC i· - YFI WAC _ ___8b) A - 0 - asx f (1-v+vx)E
Thus, for the optimal s to be positive, it must be the case that this
expression be positive at s - 0, or, because < 0,as
WAC C Af < E + 1-vE.
-l+f vx X
The facts that PCeC = AAC and vxAA C - E yield the result.c c
Q.E.D.
Regulation vs. no regulation.
A complete contracting theory of regulation implies that, ignoring the
salaries of regulators, the entire economy should be regulated even if the
agencies are not benevolent. The results from the fact that at worst the
complete contract given to the agency and the industry can duplicate the
outcome of a non regulated industry by asking the agency not to intervene (and
in general laisser faire can be improved upon). Thus the only limit to
complete regulation in a complete contracting world is the cost of maintaining
agencies. In an incomplete contracting world such as the one in this paper,
the agency is given only a vague mandate and enjoys control rights in
unspecified contingencies. A non-benevolent agency may abuse those rights,
which yields a second reason why regulation of an industry may not be
optimal.23 We thus need a three-way comparison in our model: MC pricing
regulation, AC pricing regulation and unregulated private monopoly.
We now show by means of an example that unregulated private monopoly may
dominate both forms of regulation. Because we adopted the convention that the
agency's reservation utility is equal to zero, the suboptimality of regulation
in this example stems from the second reason and not the first.
Suppose that demand in inelastic. Consumers have reservation price r (r
> c) for the first q units and 0 for the following units. A private
monopolist then charges price r, sells q units and thus introduces no
distortion in consumption. Because it is residual claimant for its cost
savings, its managers exert the socially optimal level of effort e - e . The
State does not capture the firm's rent, but this imposes a negligible welfare
loss if the shadow cost of public funds A is close to 0. Thus, as A tends to
0, an unregulated private monopolist yields approximately the first-best
2 3There is another "incomplete" contracting reason why regulation may be
costly. Namely, the State may lack commitment power in an intertemporal
setting (see Laffont-Tirole [1987, 1988b]).
outcome. In contrast, the distortions due to regulation do not disappear in
the limit. MC pricing yields effort (e -AP) in state P and also dissipates
the firm's rent through the cost of achieving collusion. AC pricing also
imposes a collusion cost and furthermore elicits costly involvement of the
consumers.
Thus, it may be optimal not to regulate the industry. Conversely, it is
easy to build examples (using the proofs of Propositions 1 and 2) in with
either MC pricing regulation or AC pricing regulation is optimal.
Needless to say, the analysis of when it is optimal to regulate an
industry, in this model and in richer models, is an important topic for
future research.
Subsidies for intervener programs.
In the U.S., Congress and local legislatures have authorized funds for
intervenor programs. On the one hand, such funds allow public representatives
(Attorney general, independent public staff in regulatory commissions, public
advocates) to intervene on behalf of consumers. On the other hand, recognized
private intervenors can apply for a refund of their monetary costs.
Assume that a fraction a E [0,1] of the consumers' expenses is observable
or verifiable. Suppose that the Constitution or law specifies that the State
pay aE to the consumers if the latter decide to search (and discover) where a
E [0, ] is a choice variable in the optimal Constitution (the previous
analysis thus assumed that a - 0).
The feasibility of an intervenor program does not affect the marginal
cost regime because the consumers have no incentive to search even if they are
subsidized. Social welfare is WMC MC
Under AC pricing the new welfare 0AC (> WAC) must take into account the
fact that the shadow cost of public funds makes subsidies socially costly.
The social cost of subsidies is A(aE) and is incurred with probability
[(l-v)y+vxy]. Thus
(3.8) QAC - WAC [(1-v)y+vxy]AaE,
where WA C is given in (3.4), but with a different x, as discussed below.
Subsidies also encourage consumers to search, which, in this model, means that
the probability of cheating by the agency that makes consumers indifferent
between searching and not searching goes down (thus, in equilibrium the
consumers do not search more, but the agency cheats less). (3.1) is replaced
by:
(3.9) (1-a)E - Avxc
Last, (3.3) remains valid.
Substituting x using (3.9) and y using (3.3) into (3.8) shows that QAC
for an s given, is quadratic and convex in a. The convexity implies that for
any s the optimal a is a corner solution: a - 0 or a = a.
Proposition 5: Suppose the law can specify that a fraction a E [O,a] of
consumer expenses can be subsidized by the State.
(a) There exist shadow costs of public funds A1 and 12 with 0
< I\ < A 2 < +* such that a - a is socially optimal if A ~ A1
and a - 0 is socially optimal if A 1 A2.
(b) The agency's income (rent) may be reduced or increased by
the feasibility of subsidies for intervenors programs.
Proof: See Appendix 2.
Part (a) of Proposition 5 is quite intuitive. Subsidies reduce the
probability of cheating by the agency, and are socially inexpensive when the
shadow cost of public funds is low. Part b) came more as a surprise to us.
We would have expected that the rent would be reduced by the existence of
subsidies that reduce consumer search costs.2 4
Alternative technologies: We assumed that technological uncertainty affects
the firm's fixed cost. For instance, the agency may report an inflated cost
of the firm's equipment. Focusing on fixed cost uncertainty is natural when
deriving rational foundations for average cost pricing. However, it would be
worth developing the theory for general cost functions. Here we content
ourselves with giving a few elements for the other polar case in which the
technological uncertainty affects marginal cost:
(3.8) C - (B-e)q+f,
where f is a known fixed cost.
In the marginal cost pricing regime, the agency is instructed to maximize
social welfare over the instruments (t,p):
max{S(q)+AP(q)q-(l+A)(t+(O-e)q+f)}
where t - O(e) (because the agency has full information about the firm). This
yields
(3.9) q'(e) -
and
(3.10) p-(P-e) A 1
p 1+-A ?(p)'
where q(p) is the elasticity of demand. Substituting p - P(q) yields qMC(B)
2 4In our model the agency is assumed to obtain the full rent attached to
collusion. It is straightforward to modify the model so that the firm has
some bargaining power and shares the rent with the agency. The observation
that appropriations for intervenor programs are often lobbied against by the
regulated industry suggests that the most likely case in Proposition 5b) is
that the agency's rent decreases with the feasibility of such programs.
and eMC(P).
In the average cost pricing regime, the agency is instructed to set the
price so that
(3.11) p - O(e)+(P-e)q+f
q
where the managerial compensation t - 4(e) is included in the total cost of
the firm. To obtain the lowest price, the agency sets e so that
(3.12) 0'(e) - q.
(3.11) and (3.12) yield qAC(P) and eAC ().
In both regimes, the agency may collude with the firm. The firm's stake
i i  iin regime i is Af - O(e ())- (e ( )-L). The consumers' gain when reversing
the regulatory decision is Ai = n (qi(p))sn(qi( i)) Equation (2.15), and,
assuming E s min(vAc), equations (3.1) and (3.3) are valid in both regimes as
i
long as Af and Ac are indexed by i. Both regimes are treated like the AC
regime in the previous analysis.
Computer simulations reveal that either regime may be optimal.
Furthermore, the effect of Af on the choice between regimes is now ambiguous.
In particular, an increase in Af may make the marginal cost institution
desirable. See Appendix 3.
Standards of judicial review: Another issue worth studying is that of
standards of judicial review. We assumed that consumers come up with either
perfect evidence or no evidence. Suppose more generally that search yields
the observation of B E {(,~) that has correlation p E (1,1) with ~ (assume
that this is still hard information: ? can be credibly communicated to the
court). The court knows the accuracy p of the evidence. A standard of
judicial review might be characterized by a cut-off parameter p such that the
court overrules the agency's proposed policy if and only if p r p . Defining
a lower standard (lowering p ) encourages consumers to search, but increases
the probability of incorrect reversals of proposed policies. We have not
formalized these arguments.
4. Discussion.
Our stylized model assumes a single public decision maker (agency) and a
single watchdog/outside monitor (consumers). A crucial assumption of our
analysis is thus that other potential watchdogs ignored in our model only
imperfectly oversee the agency. In reality there are other parties within and
outside the government which can and do perform an oversight role: e.g.,
Congress, public auditors, independent boards set up to review the agency, and
whistle-blowers.25 If these parties can be given adequate incentives to
investigate the agency's activity and to release their findings, constraining
regulatory instruments to encourage consumers to oversee the agency ought to
be welfare reducing. There are two reasons why these alternative watchdogs
perform their function imperfectly.
First, rewarding these watchdogs is costly. Furthermore, it is hard to
ex-ante specify an adequate reward for a "finding that reverses an agency
decision." The finding that an agency is not buying the appropriate brand of
pencils is not commensurate with the discovery that the agency inflates prices
or sides up with regulated firms on major technological choices. Making the
reward commensurate with the importance of major discoveries would be very
costly as it is also claimed for minor discoveries. The point made here is
the same as the argument that a patent law -- an a priori suboptimal system of
rewards for innovations because it creates monopoly power -- is judged
preferable to a direct price or reward system, which would be superior in an
environment in which all potential innovations could be costlessly described
2 5To this list might be added the president and activist courts.
beforehand. In our model the consumers' stake A C reflects (imperfectly) the
size of the issue, in the same way that the monopoly profit accruing from a
patent reflects (imperfectly) the increase in social surplus brought about by
the innovation.
Second, the watchdogs may themselves engage in collusive activity. They
may be bribed either not to search for information or not to make their
discoveries public (for instance, congressional oversight committees are often
captured by special interests or the agency). In this case, they should not
be trusted to bring information that leads to the overruling of agency
decisions and to punishments. This raises the well-known question of "who
will take care of the caretakers?".
The possibility of collusion also sheds some light on why the court's
estimating the value of evidence found by watchdogs would, most likely, be
subject to abuse. We argued that, as in the case of a patent, the court would
have much discretion in determining the value of information supplied. One
can object to this argument on the basis that courts sometimes do produce such
assessments. In particular, under the U.S. antitrust laws, plaintiffs who win
their case are entitled to treble damages, where damages are determined by the
court. In a sense, however, this antitrust institution obeys the same
principle as the institution of not assessing and granting monetary rewards
for evidence of agency wrongdoing. Pitting one organized interest group
against another (plaintiff against defendant, consumers against agency and
firm) and not letting a poorly-organized third party (taxpayers) act as a
source of funds limits the scope for abuse.
While these two factors put limits on the efficiency of oversight by
Congress, review boards, public auditors and whistle blowers, they may as well
apply to consumer groups. We already argued that the first factor has less
force for consumers, because their reward (the increase in net consumer
surplus) is "proportional to" the social value of discovering agency
wrongdoing. In a sense, consumers signal the value to them of altering the
decision by searching. An interesting question is whether the second factor
applies less for consumers, that is, whether the delegates of the consumer
groups are less prone to colluding with the agency and the firm than the other
watchdogs.
While we are not satisfied by the exogeneity of our assumptions that
consumers (and their allies) are the only watchdogs and that their rewards are
fully identified with their influence on regulatory decisions, rather than
with direct monetary transfers, we feel that our model captures many salient
features of reality. For instance, McCubbins and Schwartz [1984] argue that
what appears to be a neglect of oversight of agencies by Congress is really a
preference by Congressmen for "fire-alarm" over "police-patrol" oversight
(i.e., for reacting to the whistle blowers over conducting their own
investigations):
Instead of examining a sample of administrative decisions,
looking for violations of legislative goals, Congress
establishes a system of rules, procedures, and informal
practices that enable individual citizens and organized
interest groups to examine administrative decisions
(sometimes in prospect) to charge executive agencies with
violating congressional goals, and to seek remedies from
agencies, courts, and Congress itself.
(p. 166).
McCubbins and Schwartz go on to argue that Congress's role consists in
creating this decentralized system; and that Congressmen have little incentive
to engage in police-patrol oversight because they must spend much time
detecting agency violations and yet receive scant credit for their
discoveries.
The McCubbins and Schwartz theory reflects the difficulty of designing
adequate rewards for a direct oversight of agencies. Reinterpreting the
founding fathers of our model as Congressmen and the constitution as the law
or congressional intents, our model seems a good description of their view of
Congressional oversight activity.
5. Conclusion.
Institutions may be viewed as resulting from an incomplete constitution
(or law, or tradition). Because the public decision makers who are conferred
discretionary power need not be benevolent, the comparison of institutions
must take into account the incentives they give to the public decision makers
to identify with interest groups and to counter forces to oversee the public
decision makers.
Our very stylized model aimed at finding rational foundations for the
prohibition of transfers observed in some industries and traced this
institution to a mistrust of regulators. It compared the mandate of average
cost pricing (associated with the absence of transfers) with that of marginal
cost pricing (associated with the possibility of transfers). And it showed
that average cost pricing may dominate marginal cost pricing. This type of
analysis is definitely not intended to support the prohibition of transfers,
but rather aims to point out some elements that make the observation of such a
prohibition more likely.
This normative model presumes that the framers design a constitution
behind the veil of ignorance; it is then natural to assume that they maximize
a social welfare function such as expected utility in society. As noted in
the introduction, an interesting variant would study constitutional design by
self interested framers. Our analysis in principle allows us to close the
model in other ways than the maximization of a social welfare function.
Because consumers, the industry, the taxpayers and the agency have different
expected utilities under different forms of regulation, one can predict how
they would lobby to influence the choice of a regulatory regime. Inserting
these preferences into a model of Congressional voting and political pressure
would yield an interesting positive theory positive theory of constitutional
design. We hope that future research will investigate this line.
The model is consistent with the thesis developed in McCubbins et al.
[1987] that administrative procedures such as hearings can serve as
instruments of agency control, and argues that the absence of transfers
(outside source) pits the consumers against the agency and the industry.
More generally, the creation of conflicts between agents plays a central
role in the collection of information and the provision of incentives in
public life as well as in private organization. (This comment has much
benefited from discussions with Bengt Holmstr6m.) Consider the institution of
cost-plus-profit-markup transfer pricing between two divisions of a firm,
which specifies that the selling profit center charges the cost of producing
an intermediate good plus a gross margin to the buying profit center. Eccles
and White [1988, p. 538] argue that this transfer-pricing rule induces
monitoring of the selling profit center by the buying profit center and
creates valuable information available to the central office (higher levels of
management), helping it to "obviate the loss of control associated with
hierarchies without interfering with the prerogatives of these middle
managers." This internal organization institution is analogous to the
average-cost pricing mandate of our model. First, cost-plus transfer pricing
provides the selling profit center with poor incentives for cost reduction
while average cost pricing discourages the use of the regulated firm's product
by consumers. Second, cost-plus transfer pricing induces the buying profit
center to collect information about production and transmit it to the central
office, while average cost pricing may induce consumer groups to scrutinize
the production of regulated goods and appeal to the courts (or Congress).
Last, in these two institutions, the absence of transfers from a third party
(central office, State) pits one interest group against another interest
group. The relative robustness of "sourceless" or "balanced-budget"
mechanisms to collusive activities is the key to understanding the wide-spread
use of these otherwise suboptimal mechanisms.
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APPENDIX 1
Proof of Proposition 3.
As we saw in the proof of Proposition 2, the solution is a corner
solution (s - 0) for E small. In this case, WAC is (locally) independent of
Af and decreases with E, while WM C decreases with Af and is independent of E.
So proposition 3 is trivially satisfied. Next we assume an interior solution
for s .
(i) Using the fact that s maximizes WAC (the envelope theorem), we have:
a(AW) v(l-x+xy) 2(e*) + A
Af (l+f) f
where A- yAC vx ACAC (e -(l-v+vx)E+vxAs.
(3.5) can be rewritten: A - A(l-vxy) - 0.as
Because ay/as < 0, A < 0. Moreover, ay/aAf < 0. We thus conclude that
a(AW)/aAf < 0.
(ii) Again, using the envelope theorem yields:
a(AW) -[(l-v)y+vxy] + a(AW)aE vAAC ax
c
But
a(AW)
ax -v+vy(O-(E-As))
where
o W WAG AAC _C (e
- 1+A ff
From (i), we have: A < 0 or vx(6-(E-As)) < (l-v)E. Recall now
AACvx. Thus:
c
a(E W)< -[(l-v)y+vxy] AC + y(-v) < -vxy A < 0.
aE Ac A
c c
that E -
Q.E.D.
APPENDIX 2
Proof of Proposition 5.
a) Social welfare is given by
AC(s,a) - (1-v+v(l-y))9AC+v(l -+Ry)W A C
- (l-v+vx)y(l+aX)E-(l-vxy)As
+ Vx(l-y) 1+(e
l+f
where
Sx() E(l-a)
vAC
c
and
Af
y y(s) = f+s(l+f)
Thus
SAC E [C -C ("e)aa VA AC J Af
c
+ Avys-vyE(l+aA)]
-(l-v+vx)yAE.
awACWhen A tends to zero, a8 is positive (using the fact that
WAAC AC _ c(e* > 0), unless s tends to infinity which is impossible from
(3.5).
awACWhen A tends to +o, aa is negative and therefore a = 0 at the optimum.
b) Because WAC(s,a) is strictly quasi-concave in s, to see how s varies with
a, it suffices to study L aýAC82L8s
a2AC ax[y[[ACA-C Z v+(e*) 1 +As-vE(l+aA)] +vy] - (l-v+vx)E.
aais as asl+
For A small, ax < 0 and < 0 imply that
.a2 AC . AC fsign 2 -A sign[AA- -AfEl.sign s c 1+A
From Proposition 4b), we know that the optimal agency income is strictly
AAC f
positive when a - 0 and A is small if and only if vAAC < E + . Assuming
c l+ sif
a2ACthis condition holds, the sign of aaas is negative if v is close to 1, and
posi-tive if v is smaller (from Assumption A). Furthermore, from Proposition
5a), a - a is optimal for A small. Thus, the agency income is lowered by the
feasibility of intervenor programs if v is close to one, and increased if v is
smaller.
Q.E.D.
APPENDIX 3
To compare AC pricing and MC pricing for the technology C - (0-e)q+f, we
3 2
ran a couple of simulations for the values: O(e) - 2e , f = O, p - P(q) -
1
12-q, O - 9, , - 10, v - 2. Moreover, we assume that the agency's reservation
income is equal to 1 (it was normalized at 0 in the text; changing the
formulas to allow s - 1 is immediate. The new feature associated with s > 0
is that the punishment -- the loss of s* when wrongdoing is discovered --
becomes strictly positive. This introduces no qualitative change, but affects
the level of incentive to cheat. In the range of parameters described below,
we obtained a corner solution s - 1 for the agency's income.
Proposition 1': MC pricing may dominate AC pricing
(example: A - .1, Af- .1, WACw MC - -.180).
Proposition 2': AC pricing may dominate MC pricing
(example: A - .3, A- .3, WAC-W MC - .137).
Contrary to Proposition 3 in section 3, AW - wAC-WM C need not be
monotonic in Af and E: see the following tables:
a) A - .1, E - 1.25
Af .1 .2 .3 .4 .5 .6 .7
AW -.180 -.184 -.188 -.191 -.194 -.197 -.199
A - .3, E - 1.25
Af .3 .4 .5 .6 .7 .8 .9
AW .137 .140 .142 .145 .147 .149 .150
A - .1, Af = 1
E .1 .2 .3 .4 .5 .6 .7
AW -.052 -.065 -.078 -.091 -.104 -.118 -.131
A - .3, Af 1
E .2 .3 .4 .5 .6 .7 .8
AW .001 .015 .030 .044 .059 .073 .087
